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This Article examines agency-level activity during the preproposal rulemaking
phase—a time period about which little is known despite its importance to policy
outcomes—through an analysis of federal agency activity in connection with
section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act, popularly known as the Volcker Rule. By
capitalizing on transparency efforts specific to Dodd–Frank, I am able to access
information on agency contacts whose disclosure is not required by the
Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, not typically available to
researchers.
I analyze the roughly 8,000 public comment letters received by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council in advance of its study regarding Volcker Rule
implementation and the meeting logs of the Treasury Department, Federal
Reserve, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation prior to the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. This analysis reveals significant public activity, but also a
stark difference in investment by financial institutions versus other actors in
influencing Volcker Rule implementation. It further reveals a greater unity of
interest among financial market participants than suggested by press reports and
the provision’s legislative history. Finally, the data shed light on the efficacy of the
notice and comment process as a means for federal agencies to engage the general
public and solicit relevant information in advance of rulemaking.
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in regards to the Volker Rule, just how stupid do you think the
working class is? we just passed the two bills of financial reform
and here, not even 3 months later, you big banks are at it again to
screw joe the plummer.
– Comment from Ronnie Endre to the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, November 6, 20101

INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd–Frank”),2 to fanfare and
criticism. At 848 pages, the mammoth statute amends dozens of existing laws and
creates major new federal agencies, including the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (“FSOC”) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with potentially
broad powers over systemically important firms and consumer protection,
respectively. It also eliminates the Office of Thrift Supervision, by merging it into
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and significantly reshapes
the derivatives markets, by requiring many over-the-counter derivatives to be
1.
Comment from Ronnie Endre, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2010), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1096 (spelling, grammar,
capitalization, and punctuation are all retained from the original source).
2.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
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cleared and traded through exchanges.3 Dodd–Frank will have major regulatory
and legal consequences for banks and many other financial institutions for years to
come. It is thus little wonder that both congressional Democrats and the Obama
administration claimed credit for passing historic legislation that is the toughest
financial reform since the Great Depression.4
Many commentators and press members agreed, labeling the legislation
“sweeping” and the “most ambitious overhaul of financial regulation in
generations.”5 The reactions of Wall Street interest groups, which promptly and
vociferously criticized the legislation, confirm this interpretation.6
Of particular note is section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act, popularly known
as the “Volcker Rule,” which restricts certain risky activities by banking entities
and systemically important firms, including proprietary trading and fund
investment.7 Hailed by President Obama as a “simple and common sense reform”
in the face of “an army of industry lobbyists from Wall Street,”8 the Volcker Rule
had the potential to seriously undermine profits at many of America’s largest and
most profitable financial institutions. Had the big banks finally been brought to
heel? Not yet.
One of the most persistent criticisms of Dodd–Frank, and of the Volcker
Rule in particular, is its many gaps and ambiguities, which leave a host of
meaningful issues to subsequent interpretation and implementation by federal
agencies. Many worry that, largely freed from public scrutiny, special interests can
capture the Dodd–Frank rulemaking process and generate favorable interpretations
of the statute’s numerous incomplete and contested provisions.9 Others, in
contrast, point to impediments to special interest capture at the agency level,

3.
Id. § 723, 124 Stat. at 1675–82 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
4.
See, e.g., Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, The Dodd–Frank Act
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address
Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011) (labeling Dodd–Frank “the
broadest financial reforms since the 1930s”); Press Release, White House, Remarks by the
President at Signing of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July
21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentsigning-Dodd–Frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act (referring to Dodd–
Frank as “the strongest consumer financial protections in history”).
5.
Brady Dennis, Financial Regulation Moves into New Era, WASH. POST, July
16, 2010, at A1; see also Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3 (calling Dodd–Frank “a sweeping expansion of federal financial
regulation” and a “major” Democratic legislative victory).
6.
Cooper, supra note 5 (reporting that “within minutes” of the presidential
signing, Wall Street representatives, including the Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, “were leveling criticism at the new legislation”).
7.
12 U.S.C. § 1854 (2012).
8.
Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Financial Reform
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentfinancial-reform.
9.
See infra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing these concerns).
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including the policy preferences of regulators, judicial review, and procedural
checks designed to enhance transparency and accountability.10
This debate raises the question: What happened to major Dodd–Frank
provisions once lawmaking power shifted from Congress to federal agencies?
More specifically, are industry groups attempting to influence outcomes? Is there a
meaningful counterbalance to influential industry voices? What is the public
salience of the reform? Are relevant public interest groups engaged in the issue?
And finally, what mode of analysis might yield insight into these questions?
One mode of analysis is substantive: examine the sausage. This sausage
approach examines output, usually by measuring Dodd–Frank against an idealized
version of financial reform—the reform that would have emerged under a perfect
political system. This comparison might then yield inferences about the lawmaking
process. For example, a provision that appears overly favorable to particular
industry segments might lend itself to an inference that the policy outcome is the
result of special interest influence. In contrast, one that appears to impose costs in
excess of its benefits might be attributed to pandering by elected officials. Dodd–
Frank analyses have, to date, been of the sausage variety.
The substantive method has a serious drawback, however: There is little
agreement on what the ideal response to the financial crisis should have been.
Moreover, the Dodd–Frank sausage is not yet finished and will not be for many
years to come. Given that so much of the substantive effect of Dodd–Frank
depends on still-pending administrative rulemaking, the sausage method is
especially unsatisfying at this early stage of Dodd–Frank’s existence.
Alternatively, the procedural, or sausage-making, approach analyzes
inputs by examining the financial reform sausage as it is being made to see what
goes into it. What is the level and type of interest group activity? Do lawmakers
appear receptive to interest group overtures? Is there a counterbalance to
influential industry voices? What is the public salience of the reform? Are relevant
public interest groups (“PIGs”) engaged in the issue?
While the sausage-making approach, alone, inevitably leaves unanswered
the important question of actual (as opposed to attempted) interest group
influence, its focus on process provides advantages that the substance-oriented
sausage approach does not. First, the informal notice and comment process seeks a
pluralist goal of facilitating engagement opportunities for broad segments of
society, including individuals and firms, as well as public and private interest
groups.11 Though technically open to all, administrative law scholars forcefully
debate the extent to which this ideal is met in practice.12 Second, this spirit of
openness is in some tension with administrative efficiency, causing many to
question whether attempts to expand transparency and access in administrative

10.
See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008).
11.
Id. at 123–25.
12.
Id. at 125–33.
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rulemaking, particularly to the general public, lead to inefficiency.13 Finally, the
sausage-making procedural approach, when applied after the enactment of final
rules or rule re-proposals, could capture some of the benefits of the sausage
approach by systematically examining inputs (for example, in the form of
comment letters and agency contacts) against changes in output (that is, changes
from the proposed rule to the final or re-proposed rule).
This Article, because of the time period studied, adopts the pure sausagemaking approach, using the Volcker Rule as a case study to examine the process of
Dodd–Frank financial reform from inception through rule proposal, with a
particular focus on agency-level activity prior to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (“NPRM”). This Article thus systematically examines a less-studied
time period about which little is known, despite its acknowledged importance to
final policy outcomes.14 Later articles will address subsequent stages of Volcker
Rule activity using a mixed approach that systematically examines both inputs and
outputs.
To be clear, this is not a comment on the merits of the Volcker Rule.
Numerous objections have been raised to the Volcker Rule, some of which I
recount.15 The Volcker Rule makes for an interesting financial reform case study,
not because it is wise—that may or may not be the case. Rather, the congressional
maneuvering that accompanied the Volcker Rule’s passage and the importance of
proprietary and fund activities to banks’ bottom line signaled that the provision
had the potential to illuminate questions about which voices get heard on a major
issue of financial reform as the sausage is really being made.
Part I of this Article reviews the political and economic events leading to
Dodd–Frank’s passage, setting the stage for the agency-level activity that
followed. That review reveals substantial Wall Street lobbying, but also substantial
public interest in the legislative process surrounding the Volcker Rule, including
the various accommodations and concessions necessary to gain the votes for
Dodd–Frank passage. Both the public and the press followed these developments
closely and expressed frequent concern, even outrage, at signs that the financial
industry might escape the consequences of its role in precipitating the financial
crisis.
13.
See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV.
483, 483–84 (1997) (arguing that attempts by courts to ensure public participation and
influence in the administrative process have led to inefficiencies and potential ossification).
14.
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 231–32 (arguing that agencies complete the bulk of their work prior to
the rule proposal stage and are less responsive to the concerns of affected parties during the
notice and comment period); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking
in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 99, 110–13 (2011) (discussing the dearth of research on the preproposal stage, despite
its importance).
15.
See infra notes 36–46 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to the
Volcker Rule, including capital requirements, other systemic risk regulations, bank
downsizing, and a return to Glass–Steagall).
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Part II digs into Volcker Rule activity from Dodd–Frank passage to rule
proposal. Sections A and B set the stage by discussing reactions to the Volcker
Rule’s gaps and ambiguities, and the resulting importance of the preproposal
rulemaking phase. Section C analyzes the roughly 8,000 public comment letters
received by FSOC during the 30-day public comment period in advance of its
statutorily required Volcker Rule study, placing these data within the context of
prior comment letter research. Though scholars may debate the extent to which
comment letters can—and should—reveal information to agencies,16 comments
can reveal a great deal of information to the interested researcher, in this case
exposing both public sentiment and the involvement of relevant PIGs on this issue.
This analysis shows that a consortium of PIGs—Americans for Financial
Reform, Public Citizen, and U.S. PIRG—managed to generate a surprising level of
Volcker Rule interest among private citizens, who sent in letters by the thousands.
But, 7,316 (or 91%) of those comments are a virtually identical form letter. The
comment letters from private citizens that were not a form letter (515 comments)
confirm that people are angry about the economy; about the plight of working
Americans; and about the politicians who allowed the financial crisis to develop.
The banks are “fools,” “hogs,” and “criminals” out to “screw joe the plummer”
and should be “put in jail,” receiving no more “bailouts with citizens’ money.”17
Political officials and regulators fare little better.
But at the same time, the contrast with the meticulously drafted, argued,
and researched—though far less numerous—letters from the financial industry and
its representatives is stark. In comparison, the citizen letters are short and provide
little evidence that citizen commenters even understand, or care, what proprietary
or fund investment is, much less the ways in which agency interpretation of the
Volcker Rule’s complex and ambiguous provisions might govern such activities.
Part II.D analyzes meeting logs of the Federal Reserve, United States
Treasury Department (“Treasury Department”), Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”), Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), which, as part of the new
transparency efforts associated with Dodd–Frank implementation, were made
publicly available for the first time shortly after Dodd–Frank was signed into law
on July 21, 2010.18 It is here that the differential investment by financial
16.
Compare Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public
Participation and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 912 (2006) (arguing that
comment letters—particularly those from the general public—are unlikely to provide
meaningful information to agencies), and E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (referring to notice-and-comment rulemaking as Kabuki
theater), with Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 103, 103–19 (2005) (finding that interest group comments can, and often do, affect
the content of final government regulations).
17.
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing these and other comment letters in detail).
18.
CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41472, RULEMAKING
REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 11 (2010), available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/
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institutions in influencing this early stage of Volcker Rule implementation is most
evident. Financial institutions, financial industry trade groups, and law firms
representing such institutions and trade groups collectively accounted for roughly
93% of all federal agency contacts on the Volcker Rule during the time period
studied. In contrast, public interest, labor, advocacy, and research groups, and
other persons and organizations accounted for only about 7%. Moreover, the
quality of federal agency contacts with financial industry representatives exceeds
that of other contacts on several measures. Finally, the meeting logs, particularly
when combined with the comment letters, reveal a level of industry cohesion that
would not be predicted based on either press reports or the legislative history.
This Article concludes that, as feared by many Dodd–Frank critics, the
powerful interest groups most affected by Dodd–Frank did not waste the
opportunities provided by the Volcker Rule’s gaps and ambiguities. Instead, as
evidenced by both public comment letters and meeting logs, they actively lobbied
agencies to adopt favorable definitions, interpretations, and exemptions prior to the
NPRM. Countervailing voices were not wholly absent during this early stage of
Volcker Rule implementation. Angry citizens sent in letters by the thousands,
potentially shading FSOC’s view of the public salience of the Volcker Rule and of
the relative power of active PIGs. Conclusions regarding the ultimate impact of
this activity are left for another day. Nonetheless, these results challenge the
efficiency of current administrative processes and suggest that the pluralist ideal of
administrative law has not been fully realized, at least in the case of the Volcker
Rule.

I. FROM INCEPTION TO PASSAGE
A. Crisis and Reform
Dodd–Frank emerged in the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since
the Great Depression.19 U.S. financial firms suffered heavy losses in 2007 and
2008, largely from sharp declines in the value of mortgage-related assets. Several
firms failed. Others were saved only through taxpayer bailouts. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were placed in government conservatorship; Merrill Lynch was sold
to Bank of America in a deal backed by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
Department; Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy; and AIG, facing catastrophic
losses on credit default swaps, averted default only through an $85 billion loan
files/255/CRS-R41472.pdf (discussing voluntary transparency efforts by the federal
agencies charged with implementing Dodd–Frank, including logging interest group
meetings and making such logs publicly available through agency websites).
19.
The general facts of the financial crisis have by now been retold many times
in numerous sources. The details in this paragraph are drawn from FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf; The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions, FED. RES. BANK
ST. LOUIS, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline (last visited Feb. 11, 2013)
(providing detailed timeline of these events).
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from the Federal Reserve. In the wake of general financial panic, Congress
intervened with the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), and
the Federal Reserve stepped in to provide liquidity through several lending
facilities. Despite these interventions, the crisis exacerbated already weakening
economic conditions: asset prices fell; unemployment rose; business investment
stalled; and consumers suffered losses in housing values, retirement, and
investment funds. Against this background, Congress and the Obama
administration launched a financial reform effort.
The legislation that became Dodd–Frank got its start when the Obama
administration announced on June 17, 2009, an “extraordinary response to a
historic economic crisis,” and outlined the basic framework it intended to pursue
for financial reform.20 This was followed by a more extensive proposal from the
Treasury Department.”21
Although President Obama later claimed that Dodd–Frank contained 90%
of his initial framework,22 early reactions to the proposed reforms were negative.23
Throughout the second half of 2009, reform advocates from the Obama camp (and,
in particular, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner) defended the administration’s
financial reform proposal against critics on both the right and the left.
Conservative Republicans, for example, portrayed the President’s proposed
financial reforms as a formalization of the “too big to fail” policies from 2008 and
as more of the same Big Government outlook that gave us health care reform.24
The Left, meanwhile, complained that the proposal overly favored Wall Street and
failed to account for consumer concerns.25 As a consequence, the administration
was forced to alter certain portions of the proposal that critics contended invited
bailouts, and to make other concessions.26
One important concession was the addition of a provision that would limit
banks’ ability to engage in proprietary trading and to invest in or sponsor hedge or
private equity funds.27 That provision, known as the Volcker Rule, was highly

20.
Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on 21st Century
Financial Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform.
21.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.
22.
Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Wall Street
Reform (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-wall-street-reform-1.
23.
DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 3 (2011).
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Only a single sentence in the Treasury Department’s initial 89-page proposal
references proprietary trading and hedge funds. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 21, at
32 (“Finally, the Federal Reserve and the federal banking agencies should tighten the
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contested, both because of philosophical objections and because it had the
potential to seriously impact the profitability of banks’ operations.28 The full depth
of that impact will ultimately depend on interpretation and enforcement, as
discussed below.
B. The Volcker Rule: Politics and History
The Volcker Rule originated in January 2009, when the Group of Thirty,
an international group of 30 leading finance professionals and academics
(including Paul Volcker, chair of the financial reform working group, former
Chairman of the Trustees, and now Chairman Emeritus), released a report
containing 18 recommendations for global financial reform.29 The first of those
recommendations proposed that:
Large, systemically important banking institutions should be
restricted in undertaking proprietary activities that present
particularly high risks and serious conflicts of interest. Sponsorship
and management of commingled private pools of capital (that is,
hedge and private equity funds in which the banking institutions
own capital is commingled with client funds) should ordinarily be
prohibited and large proprietary trading should be limited by strict
capital and liquidity requirements.30

But the idea was not initially embraced, either by the Obama administration or by
House and Senate Democratic leaders.
The initial House version of Dodd–Frank, introduced by Barney Frank on
December 2, 2009, did not ban proprietary trading nor did it limit fund
investment.31 It did, however, grant power to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to prohibit proprietary trading if the Board determined
that it posed “an existing or foreseeable threat to the safety and soundness of such

supervision and regulation of potential conflicts of interest generated by the affiliation of
banks and other financial firms, such as proprietary trading units and hedge funds.”).
28.
Christine Harper, Goldman Special Situation Profit Seen at Risk with Volcker
Rule, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0328/goldman-special-situation-profit-at-risk-with-volcker-correct-.html
(discussing
the
importance of certain proprietary investment activity to Goldman Sachs’ profits); Cyrus
Sanati, Wall St. Tries to Put a Price on Volcker Rule, DEALBOOK (Jan. 28, 2010, 6:33 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/wall-st-tries-to-put-a-price-on-the-volcker-rule/
(estimating the effects of the Volcker Rule proprietary trading ban on various banking
institutions).
29.
GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY
STABILITY (2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/G30
Report.pdf.
30.
Id. at 28.
31.
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (as introduced in House of Representatives, Dec. 2, 2009). For a more detailed
legislative history of the Volcker Rule, see Merkley & Levin, supra note 4, at 531–38.
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company or to the financial stability of the United States.”32 This portion of the bill
was passed by the House unchanged.33
The Senate version, originally introduced by Christopher Dodd on April
15, 2010, directed the appropriate federal banking agencies to develop rules
prohibiting both proprietary trading and fund investment and sponsorship.34 These
prohibitions were subject to the recommendations and modifications of FSOC,
which was directed to conduct a study regarding the risks and conflicts associated
with proprietary trading by the entities covered in the bill.35 Both the House and
Senate versions contained exceptions to these restrictions, many of which were
retained in the final Dodd–Frank legislation, the details of which are discussed
below in Part I.C.
As already noted, the Obama administration’s reform proposal did not
contain restrictions on proprietary trading or fund investment. Indeed, the
administration explicitly resisted such limits,36 believing that size and
interconnectedness—rather than organization as a banking entity—were what
made an institution too important to fail.37 Many economists agreed.38
In the wake of the crisis and the bailouts that accompanied it, some
reform advocates wanted to break up the largest financial institutions so that no
entity could again be too big to fail.39 Several economists actively involved in
reform debates, such as Simon Johnson, Joseph Stiglitz, and Nouriel Roubini
publicly advocated this approach, which gained some adherents in the Senate.40
32.
H.R. 4173, § 1116.
33.
Id. § 1117 (as engrossed in House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 2009).
34.
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
§§ 619, 989 (as introduced in Senate, Apr. 15, 2010).
35.
Id. § 989.
36.
SKEEL, supra note 23, at 54–57. Though Tim Geithner is often depicted as
the public face of such resistance, other sources paint Larry Summers as the primary
roadblock to the Volcker Rule within the Obama camp. See RICHARD WOLFFE, REVIVAL:
THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL IN THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 170–71 (2011) (discussing
Larry Summers’s opposition to the Volcker Rule, which he considered “unrealistic and
unworkable”).
37.
John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s Economic Adviser and His Battles
over the Financial-Reform Bill, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25, 27.
38.
Id. (“[T]he crisis would have unfolded precisely as it did” even if the
Volcker Rule had been in effect (quoting Benn Steil, economist at the Council on Foreign
Relations)); Id. at 30 (arguing that banks were likely to find other ways to take risks and that
the Volcker Rule could create a false sense of safety (quoting Raghuram Rajan, University
of Chicago economist)).
39.
SKEEL, supra note 23, at 49–50.
40.
See generally Debt Financing in the Domestic Financial Sector: Hearing on
S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (testimony of Dr. Joseph Stiglitz) (“We
should not allow any bank to grow to a size that it poses a systemic risk to the economy.”);
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 208–13 (2010) (discussing the risk to the financial system posed by
large, concentrated financial power and urging a breakup of big banks); Nouriel Roubini &
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The Brown-Kaufman SAFE Banking Amendment, introduced in the Senate on
April 21, 2010, would have prohibited bank holding companies from holding more
than 10% of total U.S. insured deposits and more than 2% of gross domestic
product (“GDP”) in liabilities and would have imposed other capital requirements
and leverage restrictions.41 The rule reportedly would have required downsizing by
some of the largest U.S. banks, including Citigroup and Goldman Sachs.42 It was
defeated 33–61 on May 6, 2010, with 27 Democrats voting against the
amendment.43
Other reformers looked back with nostalgia at Glass–Steagall, which
since the 1930s had separated commercial and investment banking.44 Since its
repeal in 1999, the lines between commercial and investment banking had become
increasingly blurred and proprietary trading had come to represent an ever-larger
share of the profits of financial institutions, including commercial banks and bank
holding companies.45 As a result, many—including Paul Volcker himself—
believed that the Volcker Rule would at least partially restore Glass–Steagall’s
legal divide between commercial and investment banking.46
Needless to say, affected financial institutions lobbied hard against these
efforts.47 Just as importantly, the Obama administration also resisted these reforms,
arguing that Dodd–Frank’s increased oversight of systemically important
institutions was sufficient to protect against future bailouts.48 However,
intervening events between introduction and passage of Dodd–Frank continued to
stoke the American public’s fears of another financial crisis and their anger over
perceived Wall Street excesses, which necessitated further action from the Obama
administration if Dodd–Frank was to become a reality.
Stephen Mihm, Bust up the Banks, DAILY BEAST (May 6, 2010, 8:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/05/07/bust-up-the-banks.html (arguing that
the Obama reform proposals do not go far enough and that “drastic changes . . . including
breaking up big banks and imposing new firewalls in the financial system” are needed).
41.
Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act of 2010, S. 3241, 111th
Cong. §§ 3–4 (Apr. 21, 2010) (as introduced by Sen. Brown, on behalf of himself and Sens.
Kaufman, Casey, Merkley, Whitehouse, & Harkin).
42.
David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Liberals Move to Toughen Bill Regulating
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at B3.
43.
David M. Herszenhorn, Bid to Shrink Big Banks Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES
May 7, 2010, at B1.
44.
SKEEL, supra note 23, at 86–87.
45.
Harper, supra note 28 (discussing the economic impact of the Volcker Rule
on many financial institutions); Sanati, supra note 28 (same).
46.
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 25 (reporting that Volcker believed the rule would
“go a long way toward restoring” the commercial banking/investment banking distinction).
47.
Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Spending Database, OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/lookup.php?type=i&q=dodd+frank (last visited Feb. 11,
2013) (posting lobbying disclosures on Dodd–Frank).
48.
SKEEL, supra note 23, at 44–52 (discussing the key players in Dodd–Frank
debates and their various positions); Cassidy, supra note 37, at 27 (discussing the belief by
Geithner and Summers that capital requirements were a better mechanism for protecting
against bailouts than either the Volcker Rule or Glass–Steagall).
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The public detested the 2008 bailouts and, as economic and employment
fears lingered into 2010, popular backlash increased, reaching a crescendo as news
of lavish bonuses and compensation packages at bailed-out financial firms hit the
press.49 Alarmed by the growing public discontent, senior White House officials
reportedly began to reevaluate Volcker’s reform proposals.50 The final straw came
on January 19, 2010, when Republican Scott Brown was elected to fill Ted
Kennedy’s Senate seat in Massachusetts. Two days later, on January 21, 2010,
President Obama appeared with Paul Volcker and publicly announced his support
for the Volcker Rule.51 Most observers concluded that the two events were not
independent.52
Ironically, however, Scott Brown’s election also prompted some of the
Volcker Rule’s exemptions and ambiguities. As noted, a strict ban on proprietary
trading and fund investment had the potential to seriously compromise existing
banking entity operations. Those financial institutions affected by the rule
forcefully lobbied key congressional members to weaken it.53 As it became clear
that Scott Brown’s vote was necessary for Dodd–Frank passage, he wielded
substantial clout, which he reportedly used to protect Massachusetts firms such as
State Street, Fidelity, and MassMutual.54 Only after Brown secured a definition of
“systemically significant” firms that looked to activities, rather than to size
(reportedly a carve-out for Fidelity), and a de minimis exemption for fund
investment that would allow banks to invest up to 3% of Tier 1 capital (reportedly,
a carve-out for State Street), did he provide the last vote needed for Dodd–Frank
passage.55
C. The Volcker Rule: Statutory Text
Subject to important exceptions, the Volcker Rule prohibits banking
entities from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” and from “acquir[ing] or
retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a
hedge fund or a private equity fund.”56 Systemically important nonbank financial
49.
SKEEL, supra note 23, at 55; Cassidy, supra note 37, at 28.
50.
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 28–29.
51.
Press Release, White House, supra note 8.
52.
SKEEL, supra note 23, at 55; Editorial, The Volcker Rule Could Clarify Roles
and Risks in the Financial System, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/22/AR2010012204348.html.
53.
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 29; Jia Lynn Yang, A Key Republican Vote Keeps
Banking Curbs in Play, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010, at A12.
54.
Yang, supra note 53; Silla Brush, Wall Street Bill Tests Scott Brown’s Clout,
HILL (June 22, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/104631-wall-streetbill-tests-scott-browns-clout.
55.
Fidelity and State Street Win in Brown Deal, DEALBOOK (July 14, 2010,
12:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/14/fidelity-and-state-street-win-in-browndeal/.
56.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012). “Banking entity” is broadly defined, with
some exceptions, to include FDIC-insured depository institutions, entities that control such
an institution (such as bank holding companies), and the affiliates—i.e., under 25%
common control—of both of these entities (including non-U.S. affiliates). Id. § 1851(h)(1).
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institutions are not banned from trading and fund activity, though they must carry
additional capital and comply with other restrictions on such dealings.57
The Volcker rule became effective on July 21, 2011, two years after
Dodd–Frank enactment, despite the lack of implementing rules. However, covered
entities were granted the full two-year period provided by the statute (that is, until
July 21, 2014) to comply with the Volcker Rule, with the possibility of
extensions.58 Both parts of the rule—the ban on proprietary trading and the
restrictions on fund investment and sponsorship—are subject to substantial
ambiguities that require agency definition and rulemaking.
1. Proprietary Trading
The term “proprietary trading” is defined as “engaging as a principal for
the trading account of [a] banking entity.”59 “Trading account,” in turn, is defined
as any account used for acquiring or taking positions:
principally for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise
with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-term price
movements), and any such other accounts as the appropriate Federal
banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided
in subsection (b)(2), determine.60

Much turns on the interpretation of the phrase “trading account,” which is
unclear and appears to depend on the trader’s intent when purchasing.61 Thus, a
purchase made with long-term investment intent may be permitted, even if
ultimately quickly sold.62 Similarly, speculative trades may be permitted under the
rule, provided they are held beyond the “near term,” however that phrase is
ultimately defined by regulators.63
More ambiguity is added by the nine exceptions to the ban on proprietary
trading explicitly contained in Dodd–Frank, as well as the power granted to the
federal banking agencies, SEC, and CFTC to draft exceptions to the exceptions in
order to “promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and
the financial stability of the United States.”64 Of particular importance are the
exceptions for transactions in connection with underwriting or market-making
activities, risk-mitigating hedging activities, and transactions on behalf of
customers. Each of these is a potentially vast exception, with the potential to

57.
Id. § 1851(a)(2).
58.
Id. § 1851(c).
59.
Id. § 1851(h)(4).
60.
Id. § 1851(h)(6).
61.
Memorandum from Cadwalader, Widkersham & Taft LLP to Clients and
Friends, An Analysis of the Dodd–Frank Act’s Volcker Rule 5 (2010), available at http://
www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/101510VolckerRuleAnalysis.pdf.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 5–6.
64.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
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permit much trading activity previously undertaken under the rubric of proprietary
trading.
2. Hedge and Private Equity Funds
Subject to essentially the same exceptions that apply to the ban on
proprietary trading, the Volcker Rule prohibits banking entities from “acquir[ing]
or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or
sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”65 Hedge fund and private
equity fund are collectively defined as:
an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.), but for
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar funds as the
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
may, by rule, as provided in subsection (b)(2), determine.66

Section 619 provides a “de minimis” exception to the restrictions on fund
activity,67 with the goal of facilitating customer-focused advisory services.68 This
amount must not exceed 3% of the total ownership interests of the fund one year
after its inception and must be immaterial to the covered banking entity as defined
by regulation.69 In addition, the aggregate investments of each regulated banking
entity in all such funds may not exceed 3% of its Tier 1 capital.70
As is the case with the restrictions on proprietary trading, the restrictions
on fund investment require substantial agency definition and clarification. For
example, the 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemptions are relied on by a variety of legal
entities other than hedge and private equity funds. Employee pension funds and
traditional parent-subsidiary investments thus could be impacted by a strict
interpretation of section 619, even though these activities do not appear to have
been within Congress’s intended restrictions.71 At the same time, a strict
interpretation would exempt certain commodity pools and other risky activities
from the Volcker Rule’s reach, even though these investments pose similar risks to
the activities Congress sought to restrict.72

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1851(h)(2).
Id. § 1851(d)(4).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-529, PROPRIETARY TRADING:
REGULATORS WILL NEED MORE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO FULLY MONITOR
COMPLIANCE WITH NEW RESTRICTIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTED 4 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11529.pdf.
69.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(4)(b)(ii)(I).
70.
Id. § 1851(d)(4)(b)(ii)(II).
71.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 68, at 40.
72.
Id.
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D. Section Summary
In sum, the Volcker Rule originated as a political concession. Dismissed
by the Obama administration and many economists as unnecessary and
unworkable, it nonetheless became a necessary element in the campaign to quell
complaints that Dodd–Frank did not do enough to reign in large, risky financial
institutions. But for reasons both practical and political, the Volcker Rule that
emerged from the legislature and was signed into law contained broad gaps and
ambiguities on key definitional issues.
An examination of the problems in defining and identifying proprietary
trading will help illustrate these points. In anticipation of the Volcker Rule, a
number of affected banking entities shut down or announced an intention to shut
down their stand-alone proprietary trading desks.73 But, even before Volcker Rule
passage, stand-alone proprietary trading activity accounted for a relatively small
amount of banking entity revenues, probably around 3%.74 To avoid an easy endrun around the Volcker Rule’s restrictions, federal regulators will have to police
proprietary trading that takes place outside of designated proprietary trading desks.
This is no easy task. Much of the trading activity explicitly permitted by
the Volcker Rule—in particular, market making, hedging, underwriting, and
transactions on behalf of customers—displays objective characteristics very
similar to proprietary trading, with the distinguishing trait being primarily the
trader’s motive.75 Many firms, for example, take proprietary positions in the course
of servicing customer orders or market making, and their trades are argued to
provide liquidity, especially in thin markets.76 Affected industry members contend
that zealous enforcement of the proprietary trading ban, which could restrict other
bank principal positions, would impair customer service, market liquidity, and
other beneficial functions performed by many banking entities.77 Many banking
entity customers and other market participants agree.78 Balancing these competing
concerns and implementing workable and enforceable definitions of permitted and
73.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS &
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 2 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
The same is true of much impermissible fund activity. Id.
74.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 68, at 16.
75.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 1.
76.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 68, at 28–29.
77.
Id. at 28.
78.
See, e.g., Letter from Investment Company Institute to Financial Stability
Oversight Council 1–2 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/24696.pdf
(urging that the FSOC study clarify that the exceptions to the proprietary trading ban permit
the provision of liquidity and execution services on investment fund trades); Letter from
Private Equity Growth Capital Council to Financial Stability Oversight Council 2–3 (Nov.
5, 2010), available at http://www.pegcc.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/PEGCC-FSOCVolcker-Rule-Comment-Letter.pdf (arguing that Congress did not intend the Volcker Rule
to prohibit the ability of banks to provide intermediary services to the private equity
industry).
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prohibited activity falls to the five federal agencies charged with Volcker Rule
implementation.

II. MAKING THE SAUSAGE: FROM PASSAGE TO PROPOSAL
A. Setting the Stage: Gaps and Ambiguities
The preceding Part detailed the substantial definitional ambiguities
surrounding important Volcker Rule provisions, including the definitions of
“proprietary trading” and its nine exceptions, as well as the definitions of “hedge”
and “private equity” fund. Other Dodd–Frank sections are similarly indefinite,
prompting numerous requests for the clarification of definitions, prohibitions, and
exemptions.79
Dodd–Frank is conspicuously lacking in particulars, a fact recognized by
nearly every commentator—popular, academic, and practitioner—to address the
issue. As The New York Times stated shortly before Dodd–Frank’s passage:
“[Dodd–Frank] is basically a 2,000-page missive to federal agencies, instructing
regulators to address subjects ranging from derivatives trading to document
retention. But it is notably short on specifics, giving regulators significant power to
determine its impact—and giving partisans on both sides a second chance to
influence the outcome.”80
A widely circulated memo by the law firm Davis Polk opined that “the
legislation is complicated and contains substantial ambiguities, many of which will
not be resolved until regulations are adopted, and even then, many questions are
likely to persist” and predicted a “dynamic” regulatory process between market
participants and regulators.81 Academic commentary similarly has noted the degree

79.
Peter Madigan, Goldman Sachs Tops List of Firms That Met CFTC,
RISK.NET (July 1, 2011), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/analysis/2080403/goldmansachs-tops-list-firms-met-cftc (discussing the numerous industry meetings with the CFTC
regarding Dodd–Frank implementation and noting that most meeting participants request
clarification of various definitions, especially those involving swap dealers and major swap
participants).
80.
Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at A1.
81.
Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP to Clients and Friends,
Summary of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Passed by
the House of Representatives on June 30, 2010, at i (2010), available at http://www.davis
polk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/Publica
tionAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Sum
mary.pdf. A memo from the law firm Arnold & Porter similarly advises:
We believe the ultimate impact of the Act on the financial industry will
be shaped largely by the outcome of these rulemakings. . . . In addition,
entities affected by the Act will have an opportunity to comment on the
new regulations as they are drafted and finalized by the regulators,
making participation in the process critical.
Memorandum from Arnold & Porter LLP to Clients and Friends, Are You Prepared? A
Compendium of Advisories on the Dodd–Frank Act 109 (2010), available at
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to which Dodd–Frank delegates authority and leaves the resolution of serious
issues to regulators.82 Even the Congressional Research Service acknowledges that
“many of the changes are likely to be implemented through regulations that are to
be developed and issued by regulatory agencies.”83
Many of the statute’s critics worry that this filling-in takes place outside
of the public glare that accompanied the congressional deliberations on Dodd–
Frank and provides the large Wall Street firms with another opportunity to shape
the final law in their favor.84 Some fear this potential is heightened as memories of
the financial crisis fade and the general public—temporarily galvanized by
financial-institution bailouts into an interest in credit derivatives and systemic
risk—turns its attention to other political issues.
These Dodd–Frank gaps and ambiguities assumed new political
importance as a Republican majority entered the House during the interim period
between Dodd–Frank’s passage and implementation. Some Republicans, nearly all
of whom voted against Dodd–Frank, explicitly warned regulators to tread lightly in
implementing the statute and particularly in implementing the Volcker Rule.85
Alabama Republican Representative Spencer Bachus, for example, urged FSOC to
implement the Volcker Rule “in such a way as to minimize its substantial and very
real costs, given that the gains are likely to be illusory.”86 A group of congressional
representatives led by Michele Bachmann went further, introducing House Bill 87,
a one-sentence bill that would repeal Dodd–Frank.87 Finally, budget battles for
both the SEC and CFTC, each of which require additional resources to fulfill the

http://www.arnoldandporter.com/resources/documents/Dodd%20Frank%20Act%20Compen
dium%20%28eBook%29.pdf.
82.
See, e.g., Edward J. Kane, Missing Elements in U.S. Financial Reform: A
Kubler-Ross Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd–Frank Act, 36 J. BANKING & FIN.
654, 659–60 (2012). “[D]uring and after what will be an extended post-Act rulemaking
process, decision-makers will be energetically lobbied to scale back taxpayer and consumer
protections to sustain opportunities for extracting safety-net subsidies.” Id. at 656.
83.
COPELAND, supra note 18, at 1. A total of 330 Dodd–Frank provisions
expressly require (148, or 44.8%) or permit (182, or 55.2%) rulemaking. Id. at 4. But this
does not fully capture the extent of likely agency rulemaking under Dodd–Frank as
numerous provisions that do not expressly mention rulemaking will nonetheless require
agency action. Id.
84.
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
85.
Deborah Solomon, Bachus Urges Regulators Not to Rigidly Implement
Volcker Rule, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703805704575594473849188154.html. The post-conference vote
breakdown is available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2010-208
(Senate vote) and http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2010-413 (House vote).
86.
Letter from Spencer Bachus, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., to
Members of the Financial Services Oversight Council 1 (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/d983eaa6-e793-11df-8ade-00144feab49a.pdf.
87.
H.R. 87, 112th Cong. (2011).
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requirements of Dodd–Frank, have prominently featured critiques of the agencies’
lack of attention to the economic impact of their respective regulations.88
In sum, the Volcker Rule, like many Dodd–Frank provisions, entered the
administrative process both highly incomplete and highly contested. The federal
agencies charged with rulemaking under the statute would play a substantial role in
shaping the final policy outcomes and would likely do so under the continued
watchful eye of affected industry members and potentially other interested parties.
The remainder of this Part confirms these intuitions.
B. The Preproposal Period
Dodd–Frank required FSOC to study and make recommendations to
relevant federal agencies regarding Volcker Rule implementation within six
months of the statute’s enactment.89 Those agencies were then statutorily required,
within nine months of the completion of the FSOC study, to adopt rules
implementing the Volcker Rule, based on a consideration of FSOC’s
recommendations.90 On October 11, 2011, the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and
SEC issued an NPRM (hereinafter the “Joint Rule”), requesting comments prior to
January 13, 2012, on proposed rules to implement the Volcker legislation.91 That
deadline was later extended to February 13, 2012.92 The CFTC, by a vote of 3–2,
adopted the entire text of the Joint Rule in an NPRM dated February 14, 2012,
requesting comments prior to April 16, 2012.93
The following Subsection analyzes relevant agency activity during
period from presidential signing on July 21, 2010 to the NPRM on October
2011. This Article is one of the few studies to systematically analyze
preproposal period, a time period about which little is known, despite

the
11,
the
its

88.
Jessica Holzer, SEC, CFTC Ask US Congress for Budget Increases,
COMPENDIUM (May 6, 2011), http://commoditymkts.wordpress.com/2011/05/06/sec-cftcask-us-congress-for-budget-increases/.
89.
12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(1) (2012). Those agencies are the OCC, FDIC, Federal
Reserve, SEC, and CFTC. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 1 n.6.
90.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 8. The agencies are
required by the statute to consult on Volcker implementation, under the coordination of the
FSOC chairperson (the Treasury Secretary). Id.
91.
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846
(proposed Oct. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, and 17 C.F.R. pt.
255); see also Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, The OCC Issues
Volcker Rule Proposal for Public Comment (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.occ.
gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-126.html.
92.
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 23 (Jan. 3,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, and 17 C.F.R. pt. 255).
93.
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in,
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332, 8332 (Feb.
14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 75).
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importance to policy outcomes.94 Subsequent articles will analyze the period from
the October 11, 2011 NPRM to final rule issuance.95
As Wagner, Barnes, and Peters discuss in detail, the need to produce a
proposed rule that is ready for comment pushes much regulatory work to this early
stage of the rule development process.96 As a result, preproposal collaborations
between agencies and regulated industry members, who are likely to have
technical and other expertise necessary to produce a rule that withstands judicial
review, become practical necessities.97
If much of the real work of final rule creation takes place during the
preproposal period, then one might predict both substantial preproposal lobbying
activity and limited changes between rule proposal and final rule. Both predictions
are generally borne out by existing research.98 However, research on the
preproposal stage of the rule development process has traditionally been impeded
by a lack of information; Administrative Procedure Act docketing and other
transparency requirements are generally limited to the period after publication of
the proposed rule.99 Dodd–Frank’s transparency innovations thus provide a wealth
of information previously unavailable to researchers. This Article is the first to
systematically analyze that information.
C. FSOC Comment Letters
1. The Numbers
The newly formed FSOC’s first action was to request public input on
Volcker Rule implementation—a request that resulted in more than 8,000
comments.100 To put this number into context, studies repeatedly show limited
comment activity in connection with most rulemakings, with the exception of a
relatively small number of high-salience issues that generate thousands (in a few
cases, hundreds of thousands) of comments.101 Far more typical, however, are

94.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
95.
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Guangya Liu, Influencing the Volcker Rule (Jan. 1,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
96.
Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 14, at 110 (“[T]he courts have made it
painfully clear that if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must be essentially in final form
at the proposed rule stage.”).
97.
Id. at 110–11.
98.
See CROLEY, supra note 10 (summarizing these studies); see also supra notes
14, 96–97 and accompanying text (summarizing the limited research on preproposal
activity).
99.
Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 14, at 112.
100.
Public Input for the Study Regarding the Implementation of the Prohibitions
on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,758 (Oct. 6, 2010) (soliciting public comments in advance of a
Volcker Rule study); FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 10.
101.
Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 950–59 (2006) (summarizing empirical studies of rulemaking
activity).
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dockets that receive a handful of comments.102 By this standard (and as suggested
by the legislative analysis in Part I), the Volcker Rule is a relatively high-salience
issue, particularly for a technical piece of financial reform legislation not yet at the
rule proposal stage.103
FSOC concluded that, of these 8,000 comment letters, roughly 6,550
“were substantially the same letter arguing for strong implementation of the
Volcker Rule.”104 FSOC gave no further information about these letters and did not
make them publicly available. But an analysis of the remaining comment letters
(confirmed by conversations with PIG representatives) reveals that the 6,550
identical letters are the result of an action campaign by a PIG consortium—
Citizens for Financial Reform, Public Citizen, and U.S. PIRG. Members of these
groups were provided a form letter (the “PIG form”), included as an Appendix to
this Article, urging the prompt implementation of the Volcker Rule and the closing
of any loopholes.
With the help of three research assistants, I analyzed and hand-coded the
remaining, roughly 1,450, comment letters.105 FSOC concluded that these
“remaining 1450 comments each set forth individual perspectives from financial
services market participants, Congress, and the public.”106 However, this is not the
case.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on these comments. Figure 1 displays
this same information graphically. First, the exclusion of duplicate comment
postings left a total of 1,374 comments. Of these, as detailed in Table 1, 1,281, or
93%, were submitted by private individuals. The remainder were submitted by
financial industry members, trade groups, public interest groups, think tanks,
academics, and congressional members. At first blush, these numbers seem to
102.
Id. at 956; John M. DeFigueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory
at the Federal Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 992–93 (2006) (finding
limited comment activity on the FCC docket, outside of a few outlier events).
103.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita defines salience as:
how focused a stakeholder is on the issue. Its value is best thought of in
terms of how prepared the stakeholder is to work on the issue when it
comes up rather than some other issue on his or her plate. Would the
stakeholder drop everything else to deal with the issue? Would the player
work on it on a weekend day, come back from vacation, etc.? The more
confidently it can be said that this issue takes priority over other matters
in the stakeholder’s professional life (or personal life if the issue is about
a personal or family matter), the higher the salience value.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Game, PREDICTIONER’S GAME, http://www.predictioneersgame.
com/game (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
104.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 10.
105.
We collected these comments from Regulations.gov, Docket ID: FSOC2010-0002, as of June 2011. See Docket Browser: Public Input for the Study Regarding the
Implementation of the Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/
#!searchResults;rpp=25;po=0;s=FSOC-2010-0002;fp=true;ns=true (last visited Feb. 11,
2013).
106.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 73, at 10.
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confirm an extraordinary public interest in the Volcker Rule—the raw number of
comment letters from private individuals dwarfs the number submitted by all other
categories of actors combined, including industry actors.
Pausing yet again to put these data into context, recall that—leaving aside
a comparatively small number of high-salience issues—most rulemakings receive
only a limited number of comments, very few of which emanate from individual
citizens. Instead, the lion’s share of commentary is typically submitted by industry
members, trade groups, law firms, and political consultants.107 The comment letter
data thus confirm some level of Volcker Rule salience, including to members of
the general public.
Yet, a breakdown of the 1,281 letters submitted by private individuals
reveals several interesting patterns. Contrary to setting forth an individual
perspective, over half (nearly 56%) of these comments from private individuals
use the same form letter, with some slight variations, as the other 6,550 identical
letters received by FSOC. These letters often add a sentence or two outlining a
personal hardship arising from the financial crisis or use only a portion of the form
(typically, the demands). Therefore, these comments were not exactly identical and
escaped whatever recognition software or rough exclusion methods FSOC
employed. Yet, they are the same—nearly identical—substantive letter. Thus, of
the 8,000 letters received by FSOC on the Volcker Rule, 7,316 (or 91%) are a form
letter. This is roughly consistent with prior findings on individual citizen comment
activity.108
Though scholars may debate the extent to which comment letters,
particularly letters from the general public, can—and should—reveal useful
information to agencies, such comment letters contain a wealth of information for
researchers.109 On one hand, the Volcker Rule does have some public salience—
individuals sent in letters by the thousands. Even if that salience is largely a PIG
creation, the fact that PIGs were able to rally public interest in the issue may
suggest both something about the issue and about those PIGs’ power. Moreover, as
detailed in Table 1, other nonindustry participants—including academics, public
intellectuals, and members of Congress—submitted comments. Though these were
fewer in number, they contained significantly more substance than the public
citizen comments, as would be expected.
At the same time, however, the implications to be drawn from this
comment activity are probably quite different from the conclusions one might
draw about the public’s dedication to an issue about which a regulatory body had
107.
DeFigueiredo, supra note 102, at 987 (documenting scant individual
participation in FCC rulemaking, outside of a few high-salience issues); Thomas C. Beierle,
Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rulemaking and Democratic Deliberation 10–11
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10681/1/dp030022.pdf (same with respect to
Department of Transportation rulemakings).
108.
See Coglienese, supra note 101, at 953–54; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar,
Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 449 (2005).
109.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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received 8,000 individuated comments expressing both concern about and,
importantly, knowledge regarding the terms of a particular legislative enactment.
Certainly, submitting a form letter does not require the same level of investment as
the detailed comments submitted by financial institutions and trade groups.110 As
we shall see in Part II.C, Volcker Rule interpretation is also a high-salience issue
to financial firms, particularly the large banks most affected by it, and they are
willing to expend large resources toward influencing that interpretation.
2. The Content
The remaining 515 comments submitted by private individuals that were
not traceable to the PIG form letter yield a useful comparison to letters from other
groups. Table 2 breaks down the comments by group and word count. Figure 2
displays this information graphically, showing the distribution of word count by
private individuals not using the PIG form (in light gray), private individuals using
the form (in dark gray), and all others (in black).
There are three spikes in the data, at less than 50 words, at 200–249
words, and at 250–299 words (note the larger sizes of the two far right bins,
representing comments with 350–799 words and those with 800 words or more).
The spikes at 200–249 words and 250–299 words represent the PIG form letter and
its slight variations, discussed above (in its original form the letter is 244 words).
The spike at comments of less than 50 words represents only letters from private
individuals.
The shortest comment—only a single word, “regulate”—was submitted
by a private individual.111 The longest comment, received from the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), measures 19,500
words.112 The industry and trade group comments are, as a general rule, lengthy
and contain cogent arguments in support of a generally narrow interpretation of the
Volcker Rule’s scope of prohibited activity. Overall, they advance detailed legal
arguments relying on numerous statutes and cases, reference the Dodd–Frank
legislative history, and often contain thorough empirical data. Most are
meticulously argued and carefully drafted.

110.
At a minimum, we might conclude that the Volcker Rule is not an issue of
the highest salience to the public, meaning: “This is my most important issue. I would drop
whatever I am doing and turn to this issue whenever asked.” Mesquita, supra note 103. The
same is likely not true for financial institutions affected by the Volcker Rule. See infra Part
II.D (discussing the financial industry’s investment in influencing Volcker Rule
implementation); see also Shabnam Mousavi & Hersh Shefrin, Prediction Tools: Financial
Market Regulation, Politics and Psychology, 3 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 318, 325–
26 (2010) (assigning a Dodd–Frank salience measure of 99 out of 100 to financial firms).
111.
Comment from Val Laurent, Activist, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1094.
Punctuation,
spelling, and typographical errors in this and the following comments are all retained from
the original sources.
112.
Comment from Randolph Snook, SIFMA, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0908.
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This does not mean, however, that industry and trade group letters
necessarily contain unique information and arguments. In fact, a close substantive
read of these comments suggests that, within each industry subgroup, the
arguments and evidence are quite similar. As Stuart Benjamin and Art Rai
conclude in an analysis of industry and trade group comment letters to the Federal
Communications Commission, “the words differed, but the arguments did not.”113
In contrast, comments from the general public tend to be short—the
average word count, excluding the PIG form letters, is only 86, and roughly half of
the comments, again excluding those using the PIG form letter, are less than 50
words. In addition, these public comments by and large lack specific suggestions
or recommendations for interpreting and implementing the Volcker Rule;
generally urge that the rule be “enforced” or “adopted”; contain many
grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors; and express extreme anger at
the banks and, often, at the political system as well.
One letter, from which this Article’s title is drawn, aptly illustrates these
points. Note the writer’s anger and his “working class versus the big banks”
mentality:
in regards to the Volker Rule, just how stupid do you think the
working class is? we just passed the two bills of financial reform
and here, not even 3 months later, you big banks are at it again to
screw joe the plummer. aren’t you wondering why everyone is
preferring to do business at a credit union over a bank? how about
all of us that have canceled all of our credit cards? whatch it or we
all might just pull all of our money out of the banks and make you
go under! and lose your home!114

Another commenter, echoing a common refrain, considers banks
criminals and wonders why they are not yet jailed: “Please pass the Volker Law!. I
am disgusted that banks were deregulated over the last 8 yrs which caused this
economic disaster and now they want to weaken the laws that were just passed!
They should be jailed. Where are the arrests!! They are all criminals!”115
Another, like many of the private individual letter writers, echoes the
working class versus rich banks theme exemplified by the “joe the plummer”
commenter. Her family, unlike the “unscrupulous” bank CEOs and shareholders,
works for its money:
The Volker Rule is critical to preventing banks from unscrupulous
banking activities. At the expense of American citizens, their
dependants, and their posterity banks have made trillions of dollars
for their CEO’s and shareholders. It is time to stop their inner-circle
deals and demand justice for every American. I will not allow some

113.
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 74 (2008).
114.
Comment from Ronnie Endre, supra note 1.
115.
Comment from Katherine Myskowski, Public Citizen, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0528.
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bank to rob me and my familiy of everything that we work for with
our blood, sweat, and tears.116

This raw anger at the banks pervades the public comments. They are
“fools . . . [and] hogs”117 that should be “put . . . in jail,” and receive “no more
passes”118 or “bailouts with citizens’ money.”119 Wall Street caused “a HUGE
amount of destruction and are busily going Who? Me? now.”120 Regulators, for
their part, must impose “control” lest the banks “continue to screw up,”121 and
must “[s]top the fraud.”122 Indeed, the entire country is on the wrong track. We
need to get “back to industry” so that our country “produces and exports things,”
rather than finance, which “export[s] jobs and produc[es] poverty for people who
actually work.”123
Many commenters express dissatisfaction with the political system that
enabled Wall Street to accumulate so much power. One commenter sees “no
reason to waste my time voting” unless “we replace the regulations we had on
Wall Street.”124 Urges another: “Don’t let Big Banks write the rules!”125 One
writer finds it “craven” that elected officials are accountable to big business, rather
than to the citizens:
Obviously we need to do as much as we can to control the banks
which ruin this country. They have already heisted most of the
money—to allow them to continue unimpeded would be sheer
lunacy. We understand the relationship between the money big
business gives elected officials and the laws that are written and we
are sick and tired of laws being written by and for big business at
the expense of human beings. this is craven—there is no other word
for it—and it much stop. the volker rule and any others that are

116.
Comment from Amy Margolis, Lebanon Property Management,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FSOC-2010-0002-0523.
117.
Comment from Dan Guerena, Change.org, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 4,
2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0555.
118.
Comment from Katherine Myskowski, Public Citizen, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0530.
119.
Comment from Abigail Winston, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0285.
120.
Comment from Bill Jaynes, Swan River Software, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct.
28 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0294.
121.
Comment from Ann McGill, Public Citizen, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 4,
2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0430.
122.
Comment from Abigail Winston, supra note 119.
123.
Comment from Dan Guerena, supra note 117.
124.
Comment from Mary Lou Czupek, Public Citizen Member,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FSOC-2010-0002-0240.
125.
Comment from Victor Escobar, Member of Americans for Financial Reform,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 03, 2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
FSOC-2010-0002-1058.
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meant to regulate the banks and keep more people’s money from
disappearing in the maw of corporate america the better.126

Though some consider regulators, like the banks they regulate, “crooks
[who] will ignore this,”127 others urge regulators to stand firm against the
“rapacious financial institutions”:
Surely you understand the necessity of standing firm for the subject
prohibitions as promoted by the distinguished Paul Volcker. You
will be facing gale force threats, bribes, and deceptions from
financial institutions who have amply proved they care not one whit
for the economic health of the country, for the strategic national
interest, or even the longevity of their own institutions;
subordinating all of this to their greed for bonuses that can lock in
generations of family wealth in just a few years of gambling with
other people’s money. Without the full strength of this prohibition,
the nation is doomed to be blackmailed again to rescue a kidnapped
economy. You can’t allow this, if you have one shred of integrity.
You must ignore the promises and prospects for lucrative
employment by the rapacious financial institutions anf do what is
right.128

These letters are notable for several reasons and confirm many of the
intuitions gleaned from the review of the Dodd–Frank legislative process in Part I,
and the analysis of form letters in the prior Subsection. The individual citizen
letters reveal disgust and anger over perceived Wall Street excesses and expose a
“Wall Street versus Main Street” mentality. People are angry about the economy,
about the plight of working people, and about the politicians who they hold
responsible for these outcomes. But importantly, the citizen letters provide no
substantive guidance to FSOC on how to interpret and enforce the Volcker Rule’s
complex and ambiguous provisions. Indeed, the letters provide little evidence that
commenters even understand, or care, what proprietary trading or fund investment
is, much less the ways in which the Volcker Rule might govern such activities.129

126.
Comment from Rachel Kaplan, the Village Way, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 5,
2010), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0966.
127.
Comment from Leo Stack, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0990.
128.
Comment from Critz George, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1202.
129.
DeFigueiredo and Cuéllar each find similar results. DeFigueiredo’s
examination of FCC filings from 1999 to 2004 reveals that the media ownership rules
received more filings than any other issue but were largely identical texts, mass electronic
mailings, and simple click-throughs that failed to demonstrate an individual understanding
of the complex issues. DeFigueiredo, supra note 102. Cuéllar’s analysis of three rules
issued by the Treasury Department, the Federal Election Committee (“FEC”), and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) concluded that “[i]ndividual commenters often
came across as being angry and exasperated,” failed to understand “the distinction between
the regulation and the statute,” and rarely offered “anything remotely resembling a concrete
proposal.” Cuéllar, supra note 108, at 443.
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The contrast with the meticulously drafted, argued, and researched—though far
less numerous—letters from financial industry members and trade groups is stark.
D. The Meeting Logs
1. Introduction
As part of the new transparency efforts associated with Dodd–Frank
implementation, the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, CFTC, SEC, and
FDIC began disclosing their contacts regarding Dodd–Frank shortly after the bill
was signed into law in July 2010. These logs give some insight into the work of
Dodd–Frank statutory interpretation and implementation that goes on behind
closed doors: Who is meeting with the regulators that will ultimately determine the
scope of the Volcker Rule? What interests do they represent? What are the topics
on which they are meeting? What questions are being asked and answered, and
what sort of information is being conveyed? These logs are especially noteworthy
given the previously discussed importance of the preproposal period to final policy
outcomes, combined with the traditional inaccessibility of this data.
There is wide variation in the amount and quality of information provided
by the federal agency meeting logs concerning the Volcker Rule, both across
agencies and across meetings for any given agency. As a general rule, the Federal
Reserve’s logs were the most detailed, while the CFTC’s contained the least
information. Although all agency logs disclose the date, starting time, and format
of the meeting (for example, a conference call versus a live meeting), as well as
the names and affiliations of the parties in attendance, there are large differences in
the level of detail surrounding the subject matter of the meeting. Some meeting
logs disclose only that the parties met to discuss the Volcker Rule,130 while others
provide detail on the specific topics discussed, as well as the parties’ positions on
those topics. For example, according to Federal Reserve meeting logs, at a January
20, 2012 meeting American Bankers Association representatives raised concerns
about the application of the Volcker Rule to small banks, argued that some small
banks were surprised to learn that the Volcker Rule may apply to their activities,
and expressed concerns that some banks could not comply with the Volcker Rule
by the July 21, 2012 effective date.131
Despite these differences, it is possible to form educated guesses about
the general content of the meetings, even when detailed meeting logs are absent.
Often, parties that met with federal agencies on the Volcker Rule also submitted
comment letters. These comment letters provide some insight into the likely
concerns and positions raised during agency meetings. This mechanism—

130.
See, e.g., External Meetings: Americans for Financial Reform, U.S.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM., http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Dodd
FrankAct/ExternalMeetings/dfmeeting_031212_1433 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
131.
FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF AND
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION JANUARY 20, 2012 (2012),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/aba-meeting-20120
120.pdf.
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extrapolating information regarding informal participation from formal
participation records—has been used by other researchers for similar purposes, for
example, to estimate ex parte contacts.132
In addition, one can sometimes divine the likely content (or, at least,
eliminate certain content) of meetings based on the combination of participants. A
participant at a meeting that includes representatives of Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley, for example, is unlikely to be meeting for the
purpose of urging the relevant agency to apply the Volcker Rule in a manner that
severely restricts banking entity activity.
2. The Numbers
Table 3 shows the federal agency meetings with financial institutions in
which the Volcker Rule was discussed. These meetings occurred between July 21,
2010, the date of presidential signing, and October 11, 2011, the date of the
NRPM. J.P., Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley met with
federal agencies most frequently on the Volcker Rule, with 27, 22, and 19
meetings, respectively. This accounts for nearly 20% of financial institution
meetings with federal agencies on the Volcker Rule.133 In total, there were 351
financial institution meetings with federal regulators regarding the Volcker Rule
during this time period, which accounts for more than 78% of all such meetings
during the relevant time period, as shown by Table 8 and Figure 3.
Table 4 shows federal agency meetings with law firms in which the
Volcker Rule was discussed. Each of these law firms represents financial
institutions or financial industry trade groups, and representatives of those
institutions or trade groups were typically also in attendance at each meeting. In
total, these law firms met with the federal agencies charged with Volcker Rule
implementation 35 times during the relevant time period. Sullivan & Cromwell,
Davis Polk, and Debevoise met most frequently with federal regulators, with 11, 9,
and 8 meetings each.
Table 5 shows federal agency meetings with financial industry trade
associations, lobbyists, and policy advisors to discuss the Volcker Rule—a total of
32 meetings. SIFMA and the Financial Services Roundtable met most frequently
with federal agencies—eight and five times, respectively.
Table 6 shows federal agency meetings with public interest, labor,
research, and advocacy groups to discuss the Volcker Rule—a total of 19
meetings, nearly 40% of which are with labor union representatives.134 Finally,

132.
See, e.g., Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: PreProposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 373, 381–82 (2012) (using this technique and citing similar uses).
133.
“Financial institution” is defined broadly in this Subsection to include not
only commercial and investment banks, but also asset managers, investment advisors, and
insurance companies.
134.
Labor unions are included in Table 6 because of their advocacy on behalf of
a strong Volcker Rule.
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Table 7 shows a total of 12 meetings by other persons and organizations: namely,
Senators Merkley and Levin and their staffs and Paul Volcker and his staff.
In sum, whereas financial industry representatives met with federal
agencies on the Volcker Rule a total of 351 times, there were only 31 meetings
with entities or groups that might reasonably be expected to act as a counterweight
to industry representatives in terms of the information provided and the types of
interpretations pressed (those listed in Tables 6 and 7). This is nearly the same
number of times that a single financial institution—J.P. Morgan Chase—met with
federal agencies on Volcker Rule interpretation and implementation. As shown by
Table 8 and Figure 3, financial institutions, financial industry trade groups, and
law firms representing such institutions and trade groups collectively accounted for
93.1% of all federal agency Volcker Rule meetings, whereas public interest,
research, advocacy, and labor groups, and other persons and organizations,
accounted for only 6.9%.
This is not meant to suggest that these very different types of financial
industry members raised identical concerns at every meeting. To the contrary, the
exact subject matter of the meetings appeared to differ according to the particular
regulatory concern faced by each group. The important point for these purposes,
however, is that nearly all of the industry representatives that met with federal
agencies on the Volcker Rule were seeking clarifications on the rule’s application
to their activities—most often, a clarification that the Volcker Rule would not
prohibit the activities in question.
This latter observation is an important point, as dissension among
important industry actors ensures that agencies will receive competing views and
information on the Volcker Rule, even in the absence of effective participation by
public interest groups and other potential watchdogs. For example, one might have
predicted that some industry segments—perhaps, hedge funds—would view
banks’ proprietary trading activities as competing with their own operations and
would advocate on behalf of the Volcker Rule in order to advance their own
competitive positions. But this is not the case. Instead, the meeting logs, when
combined with the comment letters, suggest that hedge and private equity fund
Volcker Rule activity has largely centered on the rule’s impact on their own
activities. Specifically, hedge and private equity fund comment letters and meeting
logs reveal concerns that restrictions on banks’ fund investments will economically
harm the hedge and private equity fund business, request delays in implementation
and effective dates, and argue that the Volcker Rule should be interpreted narrowly
to permit certain fund investment activity by banks.135
135.
See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF
REPRESENTATIVES OF BLACKROCK, INC. (“BLACKROCK”) JUNE 30, 2011 (2011),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/black_rock_
meeting_20110630.pdf (discussing the Volcker Rule’s impact on BlackRock’s business
model); Letter from Alternative Investment Management Association to Financial Stability
Oversight Council (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.aima.org/objects_store/aima__comments_to_fsoc_on_nbfcs_-_5_nov_10.pdf (noting the potential adverse impact of the
Volcker Rule’s restrictions on the hedge and private equity fund industry); Letter from
AND

2013]

FINANCIAL REFORM

81

Similarly, Senators Merkley and Levin (the Volcker Rule’s sponsors),
among others, promoted the Volcker Rule as a means to reduce conflicts of interest
between banking entities and their customers caused by proprietary trading
operations.136 One might, therefore, predict that large institutional investors would
be highly involved in Volcker rulemaking, to ensure that this purported benefit of
the legislation is not undercut. However, large institutional investors are notably
absent from Volcker Rule administrative activity, at least in the preproposal phase.
Although the Council of Institutional Investors submitted a comment letter
supporting the Volcker Rule, it is short (under 300 words) and nonsubstantive.137
The Council did not meet with agencies in person on the Volcker Rule, though it
did meet in connection with other Dodd–Frank provisions.138 On the rare occasions
when institutional investors met with federal agencies on the Volcker Rule, the
topic appears to concern the Volcker Rule’s application to their own activities,
rather than to the proprietary trading or fund activities of banking entities.139
Moreover, not all agency meetings are created equal. Many of the
meetings in Table 3 are group meetings, often part of an industry trade association
meeting. For example, 27 separate financial institution representatives were listed
in attendance at an April 7, 2011 SIFMA–SEC meeting with Chairman Schapiro.
Perhaps more telling, nearly all of the Table 6 contacts are group
meetings of this type. For example, representatives of AFL-CIO, Laborer’s
International Union of America, AFSCME, and SEIU are logged for an October
13, 2010 SEC meeting with Kayla J. Gillan and Jim Burns. These are four of the
five meetings by public interest, labor, and advocacy groups with the SEC
(Americans for Financial Reform met separately with the SEC on April 13, 2011).
And all of the CFTC meetings with public interest, labor, and advocacy groups on
the Volcker Rule took place together, on March 16, 2011.
In addition, the identity (or number) of agency representatives at certain
meetings may signal something about the importance of the event. For example,
Private Equity Growth Capital Council to Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note
78 (expressing concern about the impact of the Volcker Rule on private equity funds).
136.
See Merkley & Levin, supra note 4, at 549 (“The Merkley–Levin provisions’
broad restrictions on proprietary trading should significantly reduce the opportunities for
conflicts of interest in trading.”).
137.
E-mail from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors,
to Timothy Franz Geithner, Chairman, Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Oct. 28, 2010),
available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/12382/councilinstitutionalinvestorsletter-to-fsoc.txt (supporting the Volcker Rule due to the conflicts of interest created by
proprietary trading at depository institutions and their holding companies).
138.
FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF AND
REPRESENTATIVES OF INVESTORS IN MORTGAGE PRODUCTS APRIL 6, 2011 (2011), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/investors_mortgage_201104
06.pdf (discussing section 941 of the Dodd–Frank Act).
139.
See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, MEETING BETWEEN FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STAFF
AND REPRESENTATIVES OF TIAA-CREF OCT. 19, 2010 (2010), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/TIAA_CREF_Meeting_20101019.pdf
(discussing the application of the Volcker Rule’s restrictions to insurance companies).
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the log for an August 3, 2010 CFTC meeting with SIFMA and ISDA at which the
Volcker Rule was discussed (along with other Dodd–Frank provisions) lists 53
SEC and CFTC staff members in attendance. But Goldman Sachs’ CEO, Lloyd
Blankfein, is logged as meeting alone with SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro; Chief
of Staff Didem Nisanci; and Robert Cook, Director of Trading & Markets, on
March 9, 2011. Mr. Blankfein met with Chairman Schapiro again on October 8,
2010 at an SEC–Financial Services Roundtable meeting, at which Jamie Dimon of
J.P. Morgan, Robert H. Benmosche (President and CEO of AIG), Richard K.
Davis (President and CEO of U.S. Bancorp), and other major financial institution
CEOs are logged as being in attendance.
3. Section Summary
The meeting log data reaffirm the impression gained from the analysis in
prior Subsections: The Volcker Rule contained substantial gaps and ambiguities on
key issues, generating an intense interest in the rule’s implementation that began as
soon as the legislation was signed. Notably, federal agency contacts with industry
representatives significantly outpace those of any other group in terms of both
quantity and quality. This finding is consistent with the limited number of other
studies examining the preproposal period.140
Moreover, financial industry interests appear, at least from these data,
more unified in their interests than press reports and the legislative history would
predict, reducing the probability that conflict among powerful interest groups will
diminish the influence of any single position. This is an important finding, and one
that can be discerned only by an examination of agency-level data. Prior research
has documented a measurable influence of preproposal interest group activity on
final agency rules when there is a high level of consensus among those groups.141
Finally, the data demonstrate continuing interest in, and oversight of, the
Volcker Rule by Senators Merkley and Levin (the provision’s sponsors) and by
Paul Volcker (the provision’s original architect).142 While it is true that other
members of Congress hostile to the Volcker Rule have also remained involved in
the rulemaking process, those contacts appear, at least based on documented
evidence, limited to comment letter activity.143 No other congressional members or
elected officials have committed the human capital that Merkley, Levin, and
Volcker have. Is this attention sufficient to offset any superior influence enjoyed
by a unified regulated industry? It is impossible to determine from these data at
this stage of the rulemaking process. However, Susan Webb Yackee finds that the

140.
See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 14, at 125 (“[The] pre-NPRM
period was almost completely monopolized by regulated parties.”).
141.
David Nelson & Susan Webb Yackee, Lobbying Coalitions and Government
Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking, 74 J. POL. 339, 340 (2012).
142.
See infra Table 7.
143.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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more congressional attention a rule enjoys, the less interest group influence the
final rule exhibits.144

CONCLUSION
Statutes, like contracts, can be more or less complete, but will inevitably
have some gaps and ambiguities that courts or agencies must fill. In neither
setting—contract or statute—is this outcome necessarily bad.145 To the contrary,
lawmakers may delegate such discretionary authority to other governmental
branches for a variety of salutary reasons. For example, statutory incompleteness
may allow lawmakers to harness the expertise of courts and agencies, provide the
flexibility to adapt the statute to changing circumstances, or reduce the transaction
costs associated with lawmaking.146
Proprietary trading and fund investment are technical questions of
financial regulation about which federal agencies have substantial expertise and
experience. Understandably, Congress relied on that experience and expertise for
much of the definitional work of the Volcker Rule. But the Volcker Rule is not by
any means the type of low-salience rule that characterizes the bulk of daily
administrative work. Instead, the political conditions surrounding Dodd–Frank’s
passage suggest unusual populist pressure to address the perceived power and
problems posed by large financial institutions, which the public blamed for the
financial crisis, the bailouts that followed it, and the continuing economic woes of
the average working American. This populist pressure was met with intense
lobbying by affected financial institutions in an effort to, if not stave off regulation
entirely, at least minimize the damage that financial reform would cause. As
evidenced by the data, that populist pressure and industry interest continued into
the rulemaking phase.
Against this economic and political background, Dodd–Frank arose,
purportedly to stop “‘too big to fail’ [and] to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts.”147 But the Volcker Rule—largely an afterthought by the Obama
administration, which considered the rule unworkable and unnecessary—was an
essential concession to gain political support from Dodd–Frank critics who argued
that the law did too little to restrict risky banks. As a result, the Volcker Rule—like
many other Dodd–Frank provisions—entered the rulemaking process both highly
incomplete and highly contested, thus ensuring the importance of the rulemaking
process and of interest group attempts to influence that process.
144.
Susan Webb Yackee, Assessing Inter-Institutional Attention to and Influence
on Government Regulations, 36 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 723, 725 (2006).
145.
Parties may leave contractual gaps and ambiguities for a variety of innocuous
reasons, including bounded rationality and the high transaction costs of specifying precisely
all future contingencies. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989). Such gaps may also be
strategic. Id. at 94.
146.
See generally Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default
Canon, 72. GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663 (2004).
147.
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Thanks to the Obama administration’s new transparency efforts under
Dodd–Frank, scholars are able to view that agency-level activity from the moment
after presidential signing—well before the NPRM phase that triggers most of the
Administrative Procedure Act’s docketing and transparency requirements. This
information, seldom available to researchers up to this point, confirms what, with
the exception of a handful of studies, has been largely an intuition: The
preproposal phase is a battleground for agenda setting and that battleground is
dominated by regulated industry. Though this Article ends with the NPRM and
thus cannot document the effectiveness of these attempts, other researchers have
found such preproposal activity critical to final rule development.148
Countervailing voices were not entirely absent on the Volcker Rule.
Angry citizens sent in letters by the thousands, potentially shading FSOC’s view of
the public salience of the Volcker Rule and of the relative power of relevant PIGs.
But the comment letter findings are consistent with much prior research on public
comment letters—they are short, angry, duplicative, and provide little, if any,
useful substantive information. It is precisely this type of data that has prompted
some researchers to question the efficiency and utility of informal notice and
comment as a means of generating public input.149
Other countervailing voices include PIGs, academics, and three
individuals involved in crafting the original legislation—Senators Merkley and
Levin and Paul Volcker. This latter group, as suggested by prior research, may be
a particularly effective counterweight to regulated industry.
Finally, there is a notable lack of countervailing voices within the
financial industry itself. Industry segments, such as institutional investors, that
might (based on press reports and the legislative history) be expected to fight any
weakening of Volcker Rule protections that supposedly accrue to their benefit are
almost entirely absent from the preproposal stage. Whether this is because the
benefits of the legislation to those parties was overstated, or because, for whatever
reason, they have found it unnecessary to join in Volcker Rule administrative
activity during the preproposal phase is unclear, though research on later
rulemaking stages should shed light on this question.

148.
See, e.g., Keith Naughton et al., Understanding Commenter Influence During
Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009).
149.
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 113, at 74–75; DeFigueiredo, supra note 102, at
992–93.
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Table 1: Number of Comments by Submitter
1,281

93.2%

Private Individuals Using Public Citizen Form

766

55.7%

Private Individuals Not Using Public Citizen Form

515

37.5%

Industry Trade Groups

26

1.9%

Asset Management

16

1.2%

Public Interest, Research, Advocacy, and Labor
Groups

14

1.0%

Academics/Public Intellectuals

12

0.9%

Insurance Companies/Employee Benefits

10

0.7%

Financial Institutions

8

0.6%

Congress

7

0.5%

1,374

100%

Private Individuals

Total
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Table 2: Word Count Statistics
Average
Comment
Length
(Words per
Comment)

Total Words

Longest Comment

19,500

Shortest Comment

1
187

239,547

86

44,290

Academics/Public Intellectuals

1,522

18,264

Asset Management

2,055

32,880

Congress

2,651

18,557

Insurance Companies/Employee
Benefits

2,761

27,610

Public Interest, Research, Advocacy,
and Labor Groups

3,465

48,508

Financial Institutions

3,852

30,816

Industry Trade Groups

4,027

104,702

379

520,884

All Private Individuals
Private Individuals Not Using PIG Form

All
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Table 3: Financial Institution Meetings with Federal Agencies to Discuss
the Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011
Treasury

CFTC

SEC

Federal
Reserve

J.P. Morgan
Chase

8

2

6

Goldman Sachs

7

2

Morgan Stanley

2

Bank of
America

Organization

Total

%

11

27

7.7

7

6

22

6.3

2

7

6

19

5.4

2

2

5

6

15

4.3

Barclays

2

2

4

6

14

4

Credit Suisse

2

1

6

5

14

4

Citigroup

2

1

4

6

13

3.7

BNY Mellon

4

1

4

2

11

3.1

RBC

1

5

4

11

3.1

State Street

2

1

4

4

11

3.1

Deutsche Bank

1

2

3

3

9

2.6

GE Capital

3

3

3

9

2.6

BlackRock

3

3

2

8

2.3

Wells Fargo

2

3

1

7

2

BB&T

2

1

2

6

1.7

1

1

5

1.4

BNP Paribas

1

3

FDIC

2

1

1

Prudential

1

2

2

5

1.4

MetLife

1

2

1

4

1.1
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RBS

2

1

1

4

1.1

UBS

1

1

2

4

1.1

HSBC

1

2

3

0.9

Northern Trust

1

1

1

3

0.9

PNC Financial

1

1

1

3

0.9

1

1

1

3

0.9

1

2

3

0.9

1

3

0.9

Principal
Financial
Group
Silicon Valley
Bank Financial
Group
Sun Trust

1

1

U.S. Bancorp

1

2

3

0.9

2

2

0.6

1

2

0.6

2

0.6

2

2

0.6

1

2

0.6

1

2

0.6

1

2

0.6

2

0.6

Allstate
Ameriprise
Financial

1

Brown Brothers
Harriman

1

1

Edward Jones
Harris Bank

1

ING

1

Lincoln
Financial

1

Millennium
Partners

1

Nationwide

1

1

2

0.6

Nomura

1

1

2

0.6

Pyramis Global
Advisors

1

2

0.6

1

1
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Societe
Generale

1

1

89
2

0.6

2

0.6

T. Rowe Price

2

The Hartford

1

1

2

0.6

TIAA-CREF

1

1

2

0.6

Zions Bank

1

1

2

0.6

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

AIG
Alexandra &
James LLC
Alliance
Bernstein
Special
Opportunities
and Advisory
Services
Allianz
Arab Bank Plc

1

Atlanta Capital
Management

1

AXA Financial

1

Banco Itau
BBA

1

BancWest Corp

1

Bank of
Montreal

1

BankcorpSouth
Brevan Howard

1
1

BTM UFJ
Cantor
Fitzgerald

1
1
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Capital
Research and
Management

1

1

0.3

Capstone

1

1

0.3

Carlyle

1

1

0.3

Charles
Schwab & Co.

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

CIBC World
Markets Corp.

1

City National
Bank
Comerica Inc.

1
1

Commerzbank
AG

1

1

0.3

Credit Agricole

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

Crossroads
Strategies LLC
Davidson
Companies
Discovery
Capital
Management
Dodge & Cox

1
1

Estrada
Hinojosa

1

1

0.3

Fidelity

1

1

0.3

Fifth Third
Bancorp

1

1

0.3

Glenview
Capital

1

1

0.3

Highfields
Capital

1

1

0.3

Hovde Capital

1

1

0.3

Huntington
Bancshares
Incorporated

1

1

0.3
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ICAP

1
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1

0.3

Janney
Montgomery
Scott

1

1

0.3

Jefferies

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

Loomis, Sayles
& Company

1

1

0.3

Lord Abbett &
Co.

1

1

0.3

LPL Financial

1

1

0.3

M.R. Beal &
Company

1

1

0.3

MasterCard

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

John Hancock
KeyBank
National
Association
Knight Capital
Group

Mitsubishi UFJ
Financial
Group, Inc.
Mizuho
Corporate
Bank, Ltd.
Moore Capital
Management

1

National
Australia Bank
National Bank
of Pakistan
Natixis Global
Asset
Management
New York Life
Nomura
Holding
America

1
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Pershing LLC
(BNY Mellon
subsidiary)

1
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1

0.3

PIMCO

1

1

0.3

PioneerPath
Capital

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

Protective Life
Corp.
Putnam
Investments

1
1

Raymond
James Financial
Round Table
IMC
Scott &
Stringfellow
LLC (BB&T
Affiliate)
Soros Fund
Management
LLC
Standard
Chartered Bank

1
1

1

1
1

Stephens Inc.

1

1

0.3

Stifel, Nicolaus
& Company

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

SVB Financial
Group

1

Swiss Re
TD Bank

1
1

Thomson
Reuters
Thrivent

1
1

Tolleson
Wealth
Management
Toyota

1
1
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Investment
Corporation
UnionBanCal
Corp
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Unum
USAA

Wellington
Asset
Management
Western Asset
Management
Co.
Wiley Bros.
Total

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.3

351

100%

1

Webster Bank
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1
1

1
1
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Table 4: Federal Agency Meetings with Law Firms to Discuss
the Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011
Organization
Sullivan &
Cromwell

Treasury

CFTC

SEC

Federal
Reserve

FDIC

Total

%

2

2

2

4

1

11

31.4

3

3

3

9

25.7

2

3

8

22.9

1

2

5.7

1

2.9

Davis Polk
Debevoise &
Plimpton

3

WilmerHale

1

Barnett, Sivon
& Natter

1

Cleary Gottlieb
Steen &
Hamilton

1

1

2.9

Haynes &
Boone, LLP

1

1

2.9

1

2.9

1

2.9

35

100%

Schiff Hardin
Skadden Arps
Total

1
1
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Table 5: Federal Agency Meetings with Trade Associations,
Lobbyists, or Policy Advisors to Discuss the Volcker Rule,
July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011
Organization

Treasury

SIFMA
Financial
Services
Roundtable
American
Council of Life
Insurers
ABA Securities
Association
AIMA
(Alternative
Investment
Management
Association)
Clearinghouse
Association
Institute of
International
Bankers

CFTC

SEC

Federal
Reserve

4

3

1

2

2

1

1
1

1

Total

%

8

24.2

5

15.2

1

3

9.1

1

2

6.1

2

6.1

1

2

6.1

2

2

6.1

2

6.1

1

3.0

1

3.0

1

3.0

1

3.0

1

3.0

1

3.0

1

3.0

1

33

100%

2

Foreign
Exchange
Committee
Chief Dealers
Working Group
Greg Wilson
Consulting

1

1

ISDA

Total

1

1

Managed Funds
Association

Private Equity
Growth Capital
Council
The Financial
Services Forum
Washington
Analysis
Woodbine
Associates

FDIC

1
1
1
1
1
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Table 6: Federal Agency Meetings with Public Interest, Labor,
Research, and Advocacy Groups to Discuss the Volcker Rule,
July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011
Organization

Treasury

CFTC

SEC

Federal
Reserve

Americans For
Financial
Reform

2

1

1

1

AFL-CIO

1

1

AFSCME

1

Demos

1

Public Citizen

1

Better Markets

1

FDIC

Total

%

5

26.3

1

3

15.8

1

2

10.5

1

2

10.5

1

2

10.5

1

5.3

Laborer’s
International
Union of
America

1

1

5.3

SEIU

1

1

5.3

Third Way
Capital Markets
Initiative
Advisory
Group
(TWCMIG)

1

1

5.3

University of
Massachusetts

1

1

5.3

19

100%

Total
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Table 7: Federal Agency Meetings with Other Persons and Organizations
to Discuss the Volcker Rule, July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011
CFTC

SEC

Federal
Reserve

Senator Carl
Levin and/or
Staff

1

3

Senator Jeff
Merkley and/or
Staff

1

3

Paul Volcker
and/or Staff

1

Organization

Total

Treasury

FDIC

Total

%

1

5

41.7

1

5

41.7

1

2

16.7

12

100%
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Table 8: Federal Agency Meetings to Discuss the Volcker Rule:
July 26, 2010 to October 11, 2011
Law Firms
Representing
Financial
Institutions

Financial
Institutions

Financial Industry
Trade Associations,
Lobbyists, or Policy
Advisors

J.P. Morgan
Sullivan &
27
Chase
Cromwell

11 SIFMA

Goldman
Sachs

22 Davis Polk

9

Morgan
Stanley

19

Bank of
America

15 WilmerHale

Barclays

14

Credit
Suisse

Cleary
14 Gottlieb Steen 1
& Hamilton

Clearinghouse
Association

Citigroup

Haynes &
13
Boones, LLP

Institute of
International
Bankers

BNY
Mellon

11 Schiff Hardin 1

RBC

11 Skadden Arps 1

State Street

11

Deutsche
Bank

9

GE Capital

9

BlackRock

8

Wells Fargo

7

BB&T

6

Other
155
Financial
Institutions
Total 351
% 78

Debevoise &
Plimpton

8
2

Barnett, Sivon
1
& Natter

1

Financial
Services
Roundtable
American
Council of Life
Insurers
ABA Securities
Association
Alternative
Investment
Management
Association

5

AFL-CIO

3

3

AFSCME

2

2

Demos

2

2

Public Citizen

2

2

Better Markets

1

2

Laborer's
International
Union of
America

1

SEIU

1

Managed Funds
2
Association
Foreign
Exchange
Committee Chief 1
Dealers Working
Group
Greg Wilson
1
Consulting
ISDA
Private Equity
Growth Capital
Council
The Financial
Services Forum
Washington
Analysis
Woodbine
Associates

35
7.8

8

Public Interest,
Research,
Advocacy, and
Labor Groups
Americans For
5
Financial
Reform

Other Persons
and
Organizations
Senator
Carl Levin 5
and/or Staff
Senator Jeff
5
Merkley
and/or Staff
Paul
2
Volcker
and/or Staff

Third Way
Capital Markets
1
Initiative
Advisory Group
University of
Massachusetts

1

1
1
1
1
1

33
7.3

19
4.2

12
2.7
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Appendix: Public Interest Group Form Letter
Just two years after the Wall Street banks were bailed out and just three months
after we passed a tough new law to rein them in, the Wall Street bankers want
weak regulations so they can keep making risky bets with your money.
Because of the upcoming election, the banks thought nobody would notice that
they redeployed their army of more than 1,500 lobbyists to try to weaken the new
rules as they’re being written.
They were wrong. We noticed. And we need your help to fight back.
Regulators are accepting public comments on the new law’s important “Volcker
rule.” The rule is named for a vocal White House official who called on Congress
to stop banks from making risky bets for their own profit while relying on taxpayer
bailouts if the bets go bad.
Here’s how you can help:
1. Follow this link, and you’ll get to the page where you can submit a comment
about the Volcker rule.
2. Next, cut and paste the SAMPLE COMMENT that follows this message into the
comment box. Fill out all the required information.
3. In the required field that asks for your “Organization Name” write “PUBLIC
CITIZEN MEMBER.”
4. Click “Submit.”
The banks have already submitted their regulatory comments. Now it’s our turn!
The Volcker rule will prevent banks from trying to make a quick buck by
betting—and possibly losing—trillions of dollars and leaving you with the tab.
It’s your money that the regulators should be protecting, not the big banks’ risky
practices.
Follow this link to submit your comment.
Please copy and paste the SAMPLE COMMENT below. Feel free to edit it and
add your perspective on the economic crisis:
RE: Docket ID: FSOC-2010-0002—Public Input for the Study Regarding the
Implementation of the Prohibition on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Relationships With Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds.
Dear Members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council:
I am writing as a concerned citizen affected by the financial meltdown and bailouts
caused by Wall Street banks’ high-risk trading. I am submitting this comment
pursuant to the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) request for
comment on Sections 619–621 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.
Banks should be in the business of lending to America’s small businesses and
families, not using our money to run a private casino where the House always
wins. We never again want to be left on the hook for bad bets by Wall Street.
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I urge regulators to implement a strong Volcker Rule:
1) Don’t let the exceptions swallow the rule. If banks are profiting from swings in
prices, that’s prohibited proprietary trading, plain and simple.
2) The rule cannot allow hedge fund bailouts. Bear Stearns ended up spending $3
billion bailing out a hedge fund in which it had invested just $35 million.
3) Regulators must ban any activity that allows banks to bet against their
customers, or for that matter creates any material conflict of interest between
banks and their customers. Regulators should investigate the full range of ways
that Wall Street insiders are profiting at the expense of the rest of us, collect all the
trading data needed to monitor the system and protect taxpayers, and then use their
new powers to crack down on abuses.
Thank you for your consideration of my views.

